Lords scrutiny turns Railways Bill into test of GBR accountability

The Railways Bill has moved from the broad argument over public ownership to a more technical but decisive question: how much independence, transparency and passenger accountability should constrain Great British Railways before it becomes the railway’s dominant public body.

The bill is in Lords committee stage. The second Grand Committee sitting took place on Thursday 10 September 2026 at 12.15pm, after the first sitting on 8 September.⁴ Hansard’s daily record for 10 September, last updated at 10.50pm, confirms the Railways Bill was considered in Grand Committee and links to the full debate record.²

That sitting put the bill’s governance architecture under sustained examination. Peers probed whether GBR should merely consult local and devolved bodies or be required to treat them as operational partners; whether the Office of Rail and Road should have a stronger role in access and licensing decisions; and whether passenger and accessibility protections should be written more clearly into statute.¹

The stakes are practical rather than rhetorical. The bill would create a public rail body with control over most passenger services and much of the infrastructure framework. If the legislation passes largely unchanged, ministers and GBR would have wide discretion over access to the network, funding priorities and performance expectations. If peers secure changes, the new body could begin life with firmer duties to publish plans, consult affected authorities, justify decisions and submit to independent challenge.

The central issue: discretion versus enforceable duties

The 10 September debate showed peers focusing on the words that determine legal force. Baroness Pidgeon opened discussion on an amendment that would change GBR’s power to enter partnerships with mayors from “may” to “must”. She argued that the bill as drafted risks reducing local involvement to consultation rather than partnership.¹

Her argument was not principally about ownership. It was about whether metropolitan and strategic transport authorities can shape services in their areas, or whether they remain dependent on decisions made by the national rail body and the Secretary of State.

That distinction runs through the committee-stage amendments. A “may” power allows action; a “must” duty requires it. A duty to consult may still leave the final decision with the centre. A right of appeal or a published statement of reasons creates a different form of accountability, giving an affected body a procedural route to challenge, or at least expose, the decision-making process.

Peers also pressed the case for an independent route to the ORR when agreement cannot be reached. One intervention on 10 September argued that the bill lacks a way to resolve disagreements and proposed an appeal to the ORR as the available independent body.¹

That matters because the bill’s access framework would place GBR in the position of both infrastructure manager and a body closely connected to passenger service planning. Competitors, freight operators and devolved or city-region operators will therefore be watching whether access decisions are subject to independent review or only internal reconsideration.

ORR’s reduced role is the pressure point

The Office of Rail and Road is emerging as one of the bill’s main institutional fault lines. During the 10 September sitting, peers described the ORR and the Passengers’ Council as being treated largely as consultees. They questioned whether consultation alone gives either body meaningful leverage over GBR’s licence and obligations.¹

One amendment discussed in Grand Committee sought a formal ORR recommendation, rather than simple consultation, before the Secretary of State grants GBR’s licence, particularly in relation to safety and standards.¹

That scrutiny is likely to intensify before the bill leaves the Lords. The supplementary amendment paper published for Grand Committee includes proposals requiring a review of the ORR’s accessibility enforcement powers, including powers to investigate failures, issue improvement notices, impose penalties and publish annual enforcement reports.³ Another probing amendment would create a distinct Office of Rail Regulation and transfer rail regulatory functions from the ORR to that body.³

Those amendments may not all be intended to pass in their current form. In Lords committee, amendments are often used to test government reasoning and extract commitments. But they show where peers see the greatest risk: a large public body with operational dominance, overseen by ministers, but without enough independent regulatory friction when decisions affect passengers, freight operators, open-access services and devolved networks.

Passenger accountability is being written through accessibility and reporting

Accessibility has become a concrete way for peers to test the bill’s passenger-accountability claims. The supplementary amendment paper includes a proposed 10-year railway accessibility strategy, with measurable targets, a funding assessment, annual progress reporting and direct involvement of disabled people and representative organisations.³

Other amendments would require accessibility standards to cover step-free access, mobility aids, rail replacement services, lifts, ramps, passenger information, assistance and ticketing.³

The significance is that these proposals would turn broad passenger-interest language into trackable duties. A strategy laid before Parliament, annual reports and published data on assistance failures would give MPs, peers, passenger bodies and campaigners a basis for testing whether GBR is improving access or simply inheriting the existing network’s shortcomings.

The same logic applies to performance. In the 10 September debate, peers argued for statutory key performance indicators covering reliability, safety, passenger experience, affordability, value for money, passenger growth, financial sustainability, productivity, efficiency and freight performance.¹

The point was not that every metric must be settled in committee. It was that a public monopoly-style body without published benchmarks would be hard for Parliament or passengers to hold to account.

Funding certainty has become part of accountability

The supply chain’s concern is that governance checks are not only about who signs off access decisions. They also shape whether the railway can plan work over several years.

On 10 September, the Railway Industry Association urged the government to use rail reform and the creation of GBR to provide a smoother investment trajectory and a visible pipeline of programmes.⁶ It also called for safeguards around the bill’s ability to alter five-year funding settlements mid-life.⁶

That connects directly with Lords amendments on funding-period objectives and consultation with railway service providers and the supply chain. Peers argued that businesses investing in skills, equipment and capacity need advance sight of decisions that affect employment, capability and costs.¹

For legislators, that turns an industry plea into a scrutiny question: if ministers can change funding settlements, should they first publish an assessment of the impact on outputs, skills, whole-life cost and asset condition?

What the Lords can realistically change

The Lords cannot settle the final text in Grand Committee. The current stage is line-by-line scrutiny, normally without the same forcing mechanism as votes on Report. But it can define the amendments that return in sharper form later. If ministers resist, peers can bring back proposals at Report, where divisions are possible and defeats can send changes to the Commons.

The most plausible changes are therefore likely to be procedural rather than structural. Ministers may be more willing to concede stronger consultation duties, reporting requirements, statements of reasons, accessibility reviews or clearer parliamentary reporting than to accept amendments that fundamentally shift control from the Secretary of State to the ORR or devolved bodies.

That still matters. For a bill designed to create the railway’s new “directing mind”, the legal detail will determine whether direction is matched by scrutiny. The Lords’ immediate leverage is to make ministers explain why GBR should not face clearer duties before it controls access, funding priorities and passenger-facing standards. The bigger test will come when those arguments move from Grand Committee probing to Report-stage votes.