Russia’s Drone Shift Exposes Ukraine’s Winter Air-Defense Gap as Patriot Pledge Emerges

Digital infrastructure becomes a strike target

ISW said Russian forces are intensifying efforts to hit Ukrainian data centers and telecom infrastructure as part of a broader long-range campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s economy.¹ The think tank said Russian strikes have increasingly targeted internet infrastructure and data centers since mid-September, with Kyiv data centers hit repeatedly from September 23 onward.¹

The operational effect is not just inconvenience. Ukraine’s economy, financial system and public services rely on internet connectivity for payment processing, banking, logistics, government platforms and air-raid warnings. ISW noted concerns from Ukrainian officials and business leaders that broader telecom disruption could threaten banks, online payment providers, businesses, government services and the military, while also disrupting access to mobile air-raid alerts.¹

The Guardian reported from Kyiv that roughly 100,000 households in Kyiv and the surrounding region experienced temporary internet outages after strikes on Wednesday and Thursday. Officials fear repeated attacks could disrupt networks supporting banks, payment systems and public services as winter approaches.⁶ The report also linked the campaign to Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot missiles and Russia’s use of newer jet-powered drones.⁶

A concrete case came on September 25, when Interfax-Ukraine reported that Datagroup, one of Ukraine’s major telecom operators, said its Kyiv data center was damaged in a Russian attack. The company said customer data had been preserved and services continued from backup sites. The episode underscored both the resilience built into Ukraine’s networks and the cost of defending a distributed digital economy under regular bombardment.⁷

ISW assessed that such strikes can cause temporary outages but are unlikely to produce a total internet shutdown because Ukraine has a large and distributed provider network.¹ That is an important caveat. Moscow may not need to shut down the entire internet to create strategic effects. Repeated localized disruption can raise costs, complicate business continuity, slow emergency communications and add pressure on urban civilians during winter.

The drone volume problem is growing

The September 24-25 overnight attack showed the scale of the challenge. Hromadske, citing Ukraine’s Air Force, reported that Russia launched 295 drones overnight and into the morning of September 25, including 52 jet-powered drones. Ukrainian air defenses shot down or suppressed 267, with strikes recorded at 16 locations and debris at four more.⁴

The attack also carried a civilian cost. A 14-year-old boy was killed and at least seven people were injured when a drone hit an apartment building in Kyiv, while two hospitals were damaged in Zaporizhzhia, Hromadske reported.⁴

Russia followed with another daytime drone attack on September 25. RBC-Ukraine, citing the Ukrainian Air Force, reported 162 drones launched between 7:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. Kyiv time, including 76 jet-powered drones. Ukraine said it shot down or suppressed 127 drones, including 44 jet-powered variants, but hits were recorded at 27 locations.⁵

The growing role of jet-powered variants is significant. Traditional Shahed-type drones are already difficult to manage at scale because they are cheap, numerous and can be routed to stress air-defense coverage. Faster jet-powered drones compress response time, challenge mobile fire groups and can force Ukraine to use more sophisticated or scarce interceptors if cheaper systems cannot reliably engage them.

That is why Kyiv is accelerating domestic interceptor work. In a September 25 statement after a Staff meeting, the Office of the President said officials discussed speeding up interceptor drone production, testing interceptors against Russian jet-powered Shaheds, and protecting communications infrastructure. Zelenskyy said Ukraine had identified capabilities that could strengthen defense and was accelerating production. The meeting also produced additional decisions on protecting data centers and other communications-critical facilities.³

Patriot licenses would be strategic, not immediate

Zelenskyy’s claim about Patriot production licenses is potentially important because Patriots remain central to Ukraine’s defense against Russian ballistic missiles. Ukrainska Pravda reported that Zelenskyy said Trump told him Ukraine would receive licenses to produce Patriot missiles.² ISW also cited the statement and noted that sources in Zelenskyy’s administration said Ukraine was negotiating with the United States over licenses for PAC-3 and PAC-2 interceptors.¹

The distinction matters. Patriot interceptors are not interchangeable with low-cost counter-drone weapons. They are high-end missiles for high-end threats, especially ballistic missiles and advanced cruise missiles. Domestic production could reduce Ukraine’s dependence on foreign stockpiles and political decisions over time. It could also give Kyiv and its partners a more predictable planning basis if Russian missile and drone production continues rising.

But licensing is not delivery. ISW cautioned that domestic production would likely take time because Ukraine would need to establish facilities and source components.¹ Euronews reported that even if licenses are granted, building industrial capacity would require more than a year and would not meet Kyiv’s immediate needs. It also cited Zelenskyy’s earlier claim that Ukraine needs 5% of US Patriot interceptor missiles to get through the winter and 10% to destroy all Russian ballistic projectiles.⁸

For the coming winter, that leaves Ukraine with three overlapping requirements: more imported Patriot interceptors for ballistic threats, more lower-cost interceptors and mobile systems for drone saturation, and hardened redundancy for communications infrastructure now under direct attack.

What this means for the winter gap

The winter air-defense gap is not only a question of how many missiles Ukraine has. It is a systems problem involving target selection, interceptor mix, sensor coverage, command networks, repair capacity and civilian resilience.

Russia’s apparent shift toward data centers and telecom nodes raises the consequences of any air-defense shortfall. If a strike on an electrical substation darkens a neighborhood, a strike on a data center or internet provider can also disrupt communications, payments, remote work, logistics and emergency alerts. If those attacks coincide with large drone salvos and ballistic missile strikes, defenders must decide which threats receive the most capable interceptors.

Ukraine’s answer appears to be layered. At the high end, it is seeking Patriot production licenses and more immediate Patriot supplies from partners.²⁸ At the lower end, it is accelerating domestic interceptor drones for jet-powered Shaheds and other fast attack drones.³ On the resilience side, it is ordering additional protection and continuity measures for data centers and communications-critical facilities.³

For Ukraine’s partners, the implication is that a Patriot licensing decision would be meaningful but insufficient by itself. The urgent requirement is still to bridge the winter: supply interceptors before domestic production exists, help Ukraine scale cheaper counter-drone systems, and support redundancy for the digital infrastructure that underpins the civilian economy.

Russia’s campaign suggests Moscow is looking for pressure points beyond the battlefield: ports, railways, energy, warehouses and now the data and telecom backbone. Ukraine may be moving toward a long-term interceptor production fix, but Russia is attacking the networks Ukrainians depend on now. The policy question is whether Kyiv’s partners can close the time gap between those two realities.