Vučić exits Serbia’s presidency, but power may shift to the premiership

A legal handover, not necessarily a political departure

The government’s timeline is precise. On 27 September, it said Vučić had resigned and would hand over duties to Brnabić on the morning of 28 September. It also said snap parliamentary elections were scheduled for 25 October and that presidential elections must be held by the end of December.¹ On 28 September, the government confirmed the handover and said Brnabić would act as president until a successor is elected, with the speaker’s acting role limited to no more than three months.²

Regional reporting corroborated the mechanics. SRNA reported that Brnabić may remain acting president for no longer than 90 days and that early parliamentary elections are set for 25 October.⁸ N1 Belgrade also reported that, under Serbia’s constitutional framework, the parliament speaker temporarily assumes presidential duties when a president’s term ends early and that a new presidential election must be held within three months.⁷

The unresolved question is not whether the handover happened. It is whether the handover changes where power sits. Serbia’s presidency is formally less powerful than the premiership, but Vučić used the office as the central platform of political authority after moving there in 2017. Reuters noted that he retained tight control over his party and government despite occupying the largely ceremonial presidency, and the Guardian reported that he often announced major decisions and exercised a dominant role even while president.³⁵

If Vučić becomes prime minister, the institutional logic could flip. Instead of wielding informal power from a formally weaker presidency, he would hold a formally stronger government post while retaining leadership of the SNS bloc. That would make the resignation less a transfer of power than a relocation of authority.

The premiership route

The resignation comes seven months before Vučić’s second presidential term was due to end, according to Reuters, and before an election that could determine whether SNS can continue governing after years of mounting pressure.³ Deutsche Welle noted that Serbia’s Constitution barred Vučić from seeking a third presidential term, making the premiership an available route for continued leadership.⁹

Vučić’s own explanation emphasised political participation. The Serbian government quoted him as saying he wanted to take part in the parliamentary elections as an ordinary citizen, while AFP reported that he said he wanted to compete “as one of the people.”¹⁴ That language presents the resignation as electoral normalisation: leaving the presidency to enter a parliamentary race.

But several reports cast the decision in more strategic terms. Reuters wrote that the resignation enables a prime ministerial appointment if SNS forms the next government.³ Al Jazeera said Vučić is seeking the prime minister’s post through the 25 October vote and described the election as the most serious challenge to his rule in more than a decade.⁶ The Guardian reported that his decision to run for prime minister is seen as an effort to retain a top position and improve SNS’s chances against a student-backed movement.⁵

For enlargement watchers, that makes the parliamentary election the central event. The presidential election due by late December will matter for institutional balance and symbolism, but the 25 October vote will determine whether Vučić can convert resignation into executive continuity.

Protests turned institutional crisis

The campaign has been reshaped by nearly two years of student-led protests that began after the November 2024 collapse of a canopy at Novi Sad railway station, which killed 16 people. AFP reported that the disaster triggered a movement demanding accountability and early elections, while Reuters said protesters called for transparency in public procurement, an end to systemic corruption and an early parliamentary vote.⁴³

Al Jazeera reported that students organised some of Serbia’s largest demonstrations in decades and that their election platform includes anti-corruption measures, investigations into allegedly ill-gotten property and transparency in public spending.⁶ Deutsche Welle similarly described the protests as a major setback for Vučić’s government, driven by demands for accountability, procurement transparency and an end to systemic corruption.⁹

Vučić’s final presidential acts also draw the protest movement into the transition. Reuters, AFP, N1 and Al Jazeera reported that he pardoned 49 people connected in different ways to unrest and protest-related cases shortly before resigning.³⁴⁷⁶ The pardons may lower immediate legal tensions, but they also underline how closely the resignation is tied to the protest cycle and the legitimacy crisis around state institutions.

EU accession: continuity or reset?

Serbia’s EU path remains stalled not because of a single officeholder’s title, but because of the political model associated with Vučić’s rule and Belgrade’s foreign-policy balancing. Reuters described his diplomacy as a balancing act: seeking closer ties with China and Russia while maintaining the long-term goal of EU membership.³ Deutsche Welle similarly said he has had to juggle Serbia’s EU aspirations with close ties to Russia.⁹

The Guardian reported that Serbia’s accession efforts have stalled under Vučić because of democratic backsliding and refusal to join sanctions against Russia over the war in Ukraine.⁵ That is the core enlargement issue now. A Vučić premiership would likely signal continuity on the two files Brussels watches most closely: democratic standards at home and alignment with EU foreign policy abroad.

A genuine transfer of power would require more than Brnabić occupying the presidency temporarily. It would require competitive parliamentary conditions, acceptance of the electoral outcome, a government able to operate independently of Vučić’s personal authority, and a credible reset on rule of law, media freedom, public procurement and sanctions alignment. None of those outcomes follows automatically from the 27 September resignation.

What to watch next

The first test is whether SNS can form a majority after 25 October. If it can, Vučić’s resignation will likely be remembered as a constitutional pivot: leaving a presidency near its term limit to seek control of the cabinet. If it cannot, the resignation may become the first institutional break in a system long organised around his personal dominance.

The second test is the presidential timetable. The acting presidency cannot exceed the three-month legal window, meaning Serbia must move quickly from parliamentary elections into a presidential contest.²⁸ Vučić has indicated sequencing in which the presidential vote follows the parliamentary election, and N1 reported his remarks about a gap of more than a month between the parliamentary result and the presidential election call.⁷

The third test is Brussels’ response. If the EU treats the resignation as a routine constitutional step while Serbia’s governing practices remain unchanged, accession politics will remain frozen in familiar ambiguity. If the October vote produces either a change of government or a clear mandate for institutional reform, the resignation could become a turning point.

For now, it is best understood as both: a formal handover of the presidency and an attempted reconstitution of authority through the premiership.