Colombia’s new government faces early test over FARC peace accord

A security turn with political consequences

De La Espriella has moved quickly to define his presidency around public order. On September 8, the Colombian presidency presented the “Acuerdos de Barranquilla” with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio as a relaunch of Colombia–U.S. cooperation across the economy, reconstruction and security, with counternarcotics and organized-crime policy at the center.² The Associated Press reported the same day that Washington was offering support for De La Espriella’s approach through equipment, intelligence and training cooperation, placing Colombia’s security turn within a broader regional alignment with the Trump administration.³

The government has paired that external backing with a domestic message of rapid enforcement. In an official security balance after 36 days in office, De La Espriella highlighted more than 17,000 arrests, 73 signed extraditions and operations against what the government described as “narcoterrorist” structures.⁸

That language marks a sharp break from the peace-centered vocabulary of recent Colombian administrations. It also raises a policy question: will armed-group containment be integrated with the FARC accord’s territorial commitments, or used to justify narrowing them?

The distinction matters because Colombia’s post-accord violence has not come only from the former FARC command. Dissident factions, the ELN, drug-trafficking networks and local armed groups have competed for coca routes, illegal economies and political control in areas where state services remain weak. A security strategy based on captures or extraditions may disrupt those structures, but it does not answer the accord’s central premise: that rural exclusion, illicit economies and weak institutions helped sustain the conflict.

The accord’s vulnerable pillars

The areas most exposed to rollback are not necessarily the peace deal’s headline provisions, but the administrative and territorial commitments that make it durable.

One immediate pressure point is reincorporation. El País reported that Colombia’s Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization was near paralysis because of blocked resources and proposed cuts, threatening services for former FARC combatants.⁵ If those programs weaken, the new government could face a familiar security problem: demobilized people with fewer legal income options, less institutional support and greater exposure to recruitment by armed networks.

A second fault line is rural reform. The 2016 accord tied security to land, infrastructure, crop substitution and state presence in historically neglected areas. Yet the government has opened the door to an aerial coca-fumigation pilot using glufosinate, according to El País, a move with implications for ethnic consultation, protected ecosystems and rural communities.⁶ Supporters see forced eradication and aerial spraying as tools to weaken drug economies quickly. Critics warn they could repeat a cycle in which peasants bear the costs of counternarcotics policy while trafficking groups adapt.

A third fault line concerns guarantees for those who disarm. El País reported that the government closed a protected zone linked to the only disarmament process from former President Gustavo Petro’s “total peace” policy, affecting 99 former FARC dissidents who had laid down arms.⁷ Although that process is distinct from the original 2016 accord, the signal is relevant: future demobilizations depend on whether armed actors believe the state will preserve legal protections and security guarantees after weapons are surrendered.

Transitional justice could become a flashpoint

Santos’s intervention also points to a deeper institutional issue: transitional justice. The 2016 accord created mechanisms intended to balance accountability, truth-telling, victims’ rights and reintegration. De La Espriella’s campaign criticism of parts of the deal could revive longstanding objections from Colombia’s right, including claims that former guerrillas received excessive political or legal concessions.

If the new administration seeks to harden penalties, narrow benefits or challenge the legitimacy of peace institutions, it could reopen disputes that the accord sought to settle through negotiated compromise.

Even without formal legal changes, transitional justice can be weakened by political pressure, underfunding or selective rhetoric. A government that treats former guerrillas mainly as security risks rather than participants in a conditional reintegration framework may satisfy hardline constituencies, but it could also undermine incentives for compliance. Conversely, a government that preserves accountability institutions while demanding measurable progress on victims’ rights and non-repetition could claim a tougher posture without dismantling the accord.

The central test, then, is not whether De La Espriella abandons security enforcement. No Colombian government can ignore dissident violence, cocaine trafficking or extortion in rural regions. The test is whether enforcement is tied to a broader state-building strategy or becomes a substitute for one.

Communities may absorb the risk

Conflict-affected communities are likely to feel the consequences first. The decision to lift Colombia’s general suspension on firearm-carry permits adds another layer to the security debate, especially in territories where civilians, ex-combatants, social leaders and armed groups coexist uneasily.⁴ Supporters may argue that legal firearms strengthen personal defense. Critics could warn that more weapons in polarized or weakly governed areas complicate civilian protection.

Colombia’s ombudsman, Iris Marín, has also warned that a force-first approach may be insufficient to protect people. In an interview with El País, she argued that the government’s war narrative looked more designed for cameras than for civilian protection, pointing to risks including child recruitment, limits on humanitarian access and violence against communities.⁹

Her warning underscores a recurring lesson of Colombia’s conflict: state presence measured only through operations, arrests or aerial campaigns may not translate into safety for residents.

That is why Santos’s message matters beyond partisan debate. The FARC accord was built on the claim that security in Colombia’s periphery requires roads, land access, crop alternatives, schools, justice, political inclusion and protection for social leaders — not only soldiers and police. If De La Espriella’s government emphasizes coercive tools while trimming reincorporation, weakening territorial programs or narrowing guarantees for demobilized groups, it risks turning implementation delays into a renewed legitimacy crisis.

Binding commitment or negotiable legacy?

The new administration can argue that implementation should be stricter, more efficient and more security-oriented. It can pursue dissident groups, deepen U.S. cooperation and confront drug economies while still funding reincorporation, respecting transitional-justice institutions and protecting rural communities. That path would treat the 2016 accord as a binding state framework whose methods can be adjusted but whose core commitments remain intact.

The alternative is piecemeal rollback: budgets frozen, rural commitments sidelined, coca policy militarized, disarmament guarantees narrowed and transitional justice politically delegitimized. Such a course would not necessarily require a formal rupture with the accord. But it would reopen the very disputes — over land, punishment, security guarantees and state obligations — that made the agreement so difficult to negotiate.

For Colombia’s new government, the first peace-policy test has arrived early. De La Espriella can define the FARC accord as inherited baggage from a previous era, or as a state obligation that constrains and strengthens his security agenda. The answer will shape not only relations with Santos and the political opposition, but the credibility of any future promise by the Colombian state to those asked to disarm.