Houthi Advance Near Bab el-Mandeb Opens Second Front in Shipping Crisis

Yemen’s Houthis are no longer only a missile-and-drone threat to Red Sea shipping from inland launch sites. Their reported seizure of Mocha, pressure on the Hanish islands and advance toward Perim put the group closer to the geography that matters most at the Red Sea’s southern gate: the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.¹⁴

The shift matters because the Middle East shipping crisis is already centered on another chokepoint: the Strait of Hormuz, where the U.S.-Iran war has disrupted Gulf traffic.⁴ If the Houthis consolidate positions near Mocha, Dhubab, Perim and nearby islands, they could create a parallel pressure point at Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage linking the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and, ultimately, the Suez route to Europe.¹⁵

For Washington, Riyadh and their partners, the issue is not simply that the Houthis have taken another Yemeni city. It is that the battlefield is moving toward locations that can support surveillance, interdiction, anti-ship fire, drone launches, small-boat operations and political leverage over one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.²⁷

Why Mocha changes the map

Mocha sits on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, north of the Bab el-Mandeb approaches. Its capture gives the Houthis a coastal foothold in an area long tied to traffic between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.⁴⁸

The city itself is not the full strategic prize. Its value lies in its connection to the corridor running south toward Dhubab and the Bab el-Mandeb narrows. Reuters reported that after Mocha fell, Yemeni government forces relocated to Dhubab, opposite Perim island, underscoring that the next contest is over the final coastal approaches to the strait, not the city alone.¹

This geography compresses military and maritime calculations. From the Mocha-Dhubab axis, forces can threaten shipping indirectly through coastal launch sites, observation posts, mobile missile systems or drone teams. They can also force adversaries to defend multiple nodes at once: ports, islands, anchorages, naval patrol zones and commercial transit lanes.⁷

Perim is the hinge of the strait

Perim, also known as Mayun, sits inside Bab el-Mandeb. Control of or access to the island gives a force proximity to the southern entrance of the Red Sea, where ships funnel between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.⁵

Reuters reported September 11 that the Houthis had reached Perim/Mayun and that government forces withdrew from Perim and Dhubab.³ The Associated Press also reported the Houthi capture of Mayun/Perim, describing it as a new front in the wider Iran war and a direct challenge to Saudi oil-export security and control of Bab el-Mandeb.⁵

That is the operational center of the crisis. A Houthi presence on or near Perim would not need to close the strait outright to have strategic effect. Even the perception that the group can track, target or harass vessels in the narrows can raise insurance costs, alter routing decisions and require more naval escorts. In maritime security, credible reach can be almost as disruptive as closure.

Hanish islands add depth to the threat

The Hanish islands, in the southern Red Sea between Yemen and Eritrea, add a second layer to the problem. Reuters reported that the Houthis were attacking the islands as they advanced along the coast.¹ Maritime-industry reporting has also focused on the link between Mocha, Perim and Hanish in assessing risks to shipping and energy flows.⁷

If the Houthis gain durable positions on Red Sea islands, they could expand their maritime operating picture. Islands can serve as lookout points, staging areas, logistics nodes or launch zones for short-range systems. Even limited control could complicate allied surveillance and interdiction, especially if forces disperse across coastal and island positions.

The Hanish chain also widens the battlespace. Instead of defending one coastal line or one island, anti-Houthi forces would have to monitor an archipelago, coastal roads, small-boat traffic and the approaches to the strait. That stretches intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets while U.S. and allied attention is fixed on Hormuz.

Dhubab becomes the fallback line

Dhubab’s importance comes from its location opposite Perim and near the Bab el-Mandeb narrows. Reuters reported that Yemeni government forces moved there after Mocha fell, and later reporting said they withdrew from both Perim and Dhubab as the Houthis reached the island.¹³

For the Yemeni government and its backers, Dhubab is more than another coastal town. It is a blocking position. Holding it helps prevent Houthi forces from linking coastal advances with the strait’s immediate approaches. Losing it would reduce the buffer between Houthi-held territory and the maritime corridor itself.

That is why the fight is likely to draw outside attention even if it remains local in tactical form. A change in control at Dhubab or Perim affects Saudi Arabia’s western export options, the security of vessels moving toward Suez and the credibility of U.S.-led efforts to guarantee freedom of navigation.⁵⁶

A two-chokepoint problem for the U.S. and allies

The United States and its partners now face the possibility of simultaneous pressure at Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Hormuz is the Gulf’s outlet. Bab el-Mandeb is the Red Sea’s southern gate. Together, they frame key routes for Gulf energy exports, container traffic and naval movement between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.¹⁴

The Houthis’ coastal advance could magnify Iran’s leverage without requiring Tehran to control the Red Sea directly. Reuters, citing sources, reported that Iranian arms and advice helped the Houthis seize a key Red Sea city and that the move served the broader purpose of opening a Bab el-Mandeb front alongside disruption at Hormuz.²

That claim, if borne out, points to a strategic logic: create multiple maritime dilemmas for the United States and its regional partners. U.S. naval forces can patrol, intercept and strike, but every additional threat axis increases demand for ships, aircraft, intelligence assets and political coordination.

Axios reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman urged President Donald Trump to strike the Houthis amid the Red Sea threat, while Washington was reluctant to open another front and remained focused on freedom of navigation.⁶ That tension captures the policy problem. Saudi Arabia sees a direct threat to its Red Sea flank and oil-export flexibility. The United States must weigh that concern against the risk of escalation in an already active war with Iran.

Why shipping may react before a closure

Commercial shipping does not wait for a formal blockade. Insurers, charterers and vessel operators respond to risk signals: missile range, attack history, naval warnings, ownership profile, flag state, cargo type and the ability of hostile forces to observe or strike a route.

The AP reported that the fall of Mokha/Mocha raised the threat to Red Sea shipping at a time when Hormuz traffic was already impeded.⁴ Lloyd’s List similarly framed the Houthi push toward Bab el-Mandeb as a shipping-route risk tied to energy trade and Red Sea security.⁷

That means the Houthi advance can affect shipping even without a successful mass attack. Rerouting around southern Africa, slowing transits, waiting for convoy protection, paying higher war-risk premiums or avoiding certain cargoes all impose costs. Those costs ripple through energy markets, port schedules and supply chains.

The strategic question now

The immediate question is whether the Houthis can hold and exploit the geography they have reached. Mocha gives them a coastal platform. Hanish would give them island depth. Dhubab and Perim would put them at the mouth of the strait. Together, those positions could turn Bab el-Mandeb from a contested shipping lane into a sustained theater of the wider U.S.-Iran conflict.¹³⁵

For U.S., Saudi and allied planners, stabilizing maritime routes now requires more than naval patrols in open water. It requires attention to the land and island terrain that shapes the southern Red Sea. The crisis is no longer only about Hormuz. It is also about whether the Houthis can convert battlefield gains in western Yemen into lasting leverage over Bab el-Mandeb.